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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD HYLAND KEITZ, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No- 920558-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Donald Hyland Keitz appeals his conviction 
for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1) (Supp. 1992), entered in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Iron County, Utah, the Honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
As will be shown in this brief, this case is in a 
peculiar procedural posture, not previously recognized by the 
parties or the trial court. Because of this, the State re-frames 
the issues on appeal, as follows: 
1. May defendant preserve his "entrapment- defense for 
appellate review, without proceeding to trial, through entry of a 
conditional guilty plea? This is a procedural question regarding 
the kinds of situations in which a defendant should be allowed to 
enter a conditional guilty plea while reserving pretrial issues 
for appellate review; it also involves the interpretation of 
Utah's entrapment statute. As such, it is a question of law, 
reviewed without deference to the trial court. See State v. 
Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah App. 1988) (permitting 
conditional guilty pleas upon denial of motions to suppress 
evidence); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) 
(statutory interpretation is a question of law)• 
2. If defendant's entrapment argument is now reviewed, 
did the trial court correctly deny his pretrial, entrapment-based 
motion to dismiss? A motion to dismiss under Utah's entrapment 
statute is effectively a claim of insufficient evidence to 
support guilt; accordingly, a deferential, "clear error" standard 
of review applies. See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 
(Utah 1989). Framed as a "due process" challenge to police 
conduct, such motion may present a question of law, once the 
underlying facts are established, reviewed without deference. 
See State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988). 
3. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress marijuana seized incident to his arrest, and 
scales seized pursuant to defendant's consent? For the purposes 
of this appeal, and addressing only the marijuana seizure, the 
trial court's findings of underlying or preliminary facts can be 
deferentially reviewed for "clear error," while its conclusion on 
the constitutional permissiblity of the search or seizure, 
flowing from those facts, can be reviewed without deference. See 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990). As will be shown 
in the body of this brief, the seizure of defendant's scales, and 
the "voluntary consent" issue associated with that seizure, is, 
as a matter of law, a moot question. See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 
773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah's entrapment statute, and the federal and state 
"due process" and "search and seizure" constitutional provisions, 
are set forth in defendant's Brief of Appellant at 9-10. Other 
constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertinent to this 
appeal will be set forth as needed in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As stated in the Brief of Appellant, defendant was 
originally charged with possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, and with possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Enhanced penalties were sought because the offenses allegedly 
occurred in proximity to a Little League ballpark (R. 36-37 J.1 
Defendant's pretrial motions to dismiss the charges, 
alleging "entrapment," and his pretrial motion to suppress 
marijuana and weighing scales seized from his home, were denied 
(R. 147-50). A plea bargain was then negotiated, and defendant 
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute; the paraphernalia charge and proximity 
enhancement were dropped, as was a forfeiture action against 
xThe main record is R. 1-214; Transcripts are also numbered 
into the record as R. 215-481. All parenthetical record and 
transcript references will therefore be designated "R." 
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defendant's van (R. 160). While pleading guilty, defendant 
preserved the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motions 
(id.; R. 163). 
Defendant received a suspended prison sentence, and was 
placed on probation (R. 202-06). This appeal ensued upon timely 
notice (R. 200, 206). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court did not resolve all the conflicting 
testimony pertaining to defendant's pretrial motions that are the 
subjects of this appeal (see "Ruling" at R. 147-48, reproduced in 
the addendum to Br. of Appellant). Because those conflicts are 
largely between defendant and the police officers who testified 
at the motion hearing, this Court could assume that the trial 
court resolved them in accord with its denial of the motions. 
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991). However, 
because of the unique posture of this case, the State's fact 
recitation, while stressing the evidence supporting the trial 
court's decisions, will acknowledge the conflicting evidence, 
particularly that regarding defendant's entrapment allegation. 
The Undercover Operation 
From late 1990 through mid-1991 defendant was friendly 
with a cocktail waitress he knew as Annie, who was actually an 
undercover police officer named Ann Burchett (R. 219, 434-36). 
Burchett's duties entailed befriending any drug users and dealers 
in the Brian Head, Utah area (R. 439-41). Toward that end, 
4 
Burchett made herself known as a drug user, making drug purchases 
and occasionally feigning drug use (R. 441-43).2 
As part of her training for undercover work, Burchett 
read Utah's statute on criminal entrapment (R. 448-49). She was 
not allowed to actually use drugs in the course of her work; nor 
could she offer "exorbitant" sums of money for drugs (R. 363, 
447). Burchett was not permitted to engage in sexual relations 
with her undercover contacts, but believed that she could offer 
sexual favors for drugs (R. 449). Her supervising officer 
indicated that only "implied" sexual offers were permissible (R. 
363). In any case, acting "friendly" toward suspected drug 
offenders was part of Burchett's undercover job (R. 449). 
Burchett's friendliness toward defendant included 
occasional physical touching in the bar where she worked. On 
occasion, Burchett and defendant massaged each other's shoulders. 
Burchett engaged in similar affectionate behavior with other bar 
customers (R. 240). At the hearing on the pretrial motions, 
defendant attempted to characterize these contacts as "erotic" 
(R. 291). On cross-examination, however, he admitted that they 
took place when the bar was open, and in the presence of other 
bar employees (R. 312). 
Consistent with her cover as a drug user, Burchett 
mentioned marijuana when talking to defendant. After perhaps two 
2Officer Burchett's undercover operations in Iron County 
during the November 1990 throuigh July 1991—the same time period 
involved here—are the subject of two other appeals now pending in 
this Court, State v. Martinez, No. 920239-CA, and State v. 
Levasseur, No. 920444-CA. 
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such references, defendant invited Burchett to share a marijuana 
"joint" with him. Burchett accepted, pretending to smoke the 
marijuana (R. 221). On another occasion, at defendant's 
direction, Burchett retrieved some marijuana for him from his van 
(R. 242). Burchett also told defendant that she was interested 
in cocaine. Defendant "said he would look" for some cocaine, but 
did not produce any (R. 242-43, 451). 
Defendant told Burchett that he enjoyed watching women 
"flashing" their breasts as they travelled area highways (R. 
452). On one occasion Burchette, riding behind defendant on his 
motorcycle, feigned a "flash" (R. 453). Defendant claimed that 
the "flashing" was Burchett's idea, and that she genuinely 
exposed herself (R. 282). However, he had difficulty explaining 
how Burchett was able to lift her blouse and lean out so that 
defendant could see her breasts in his rearview mirrors, while 
simultaneously clinging to him on the moving motorcycle (R. 315). 
Defendant eventually asked Burchett if she could help 
him obtain a pound of marijuana (R. 221, 245). Burchett 
subsequently procured a pound of marijuana through her 
supervising officer, and offered to sell it to defendant for 850 
dollars (R. 224). 
The Arrest and Seizures 
Defendant came to Burchett's home to purchase the 
marijuana. Burchett recorded this negotiation via a hidden 
transmitting/recording device; her home was also under the 
surveillance of police, waiting to arrest defendant (R. 373, 456-
6 
57; transcript at R. 126-33, admitted as defense exhibit D-3A, 
copied at Appendix I of this brief)- Defendant weighed the 
marijuana on scales that he had brought with him, and asked to 
take it on a 300 dollar deposit. Burchett declined, requesting 
full payment (R. 225-26). She and defendant agreed to complete 
the marijuana sale later that day at defendant's home (R. 227). 
Several hours later, still carrying a transmitter/ 
recorder and under surveillance, Burchett went to defendant's 
home (R. 227, 230, 250-51, 456-57). There defendant paid her an 
additional 500 dollars cash, plus a fifty-dollar personal check, 
and Burchett gave him the marijuana (R. 228, 458-59). This 
transaction took place in defendant's kitchen. Defendant took 
the marijuana to the open doorway of an adjacent utility room, 
and placed it on a shelf in that room, out of immediate sight 
from the kitchen (R. 229, 458-61). 
During their ensuing conversation, defendant and 
Burchett discussed the selling of marijuana (R. 230; transcript 
of recorded conversation at R. 134-43, defense exhibit D-4A, 
copied at Appendix II of this brief). Defendant cautioned 
Burchett about "narcs," and instructed her about how to sell a 
small portion of the marijuana that he had given to Burchett 
during the earlier meeting at her home (R. 129, 137-40, 230). 
Defendant also asked whether Burchett could obtain another five 
pounds of marijuana for him (R. 230). 
After a brief tour of defendant's yard and garden, 
defendant and Burchett returned to the kitchen (R. 230-31, 254). 
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Apparently upon a signal from Burchett, the surveilling officers 
then entered; guns drawn, they ordered defendant to the floor, 
handcuffed and arrested him (R. 376, 462-64). The officers 
carried no search warrant, for they had not sought a warrant when 
the marijuana transaction site was changed from Burchett's home 
to defendant's (R. 251-52, 375). 
Burchett promptly directed the arresting officers to 
the utility room, where the marijuana was quickly found and 
seized (R. 148, 377-78, 464). Defendant stated that this 
occurred while he was still prone on the kitchen floor (R. 300), 
although other testimony suggested that he may have been moved 
from the kitchen to his living room by this time (R. 377, 465). 
The arresting officers checked the rest of the house for other 
persons, and found nobody (R. 380). They read defendant his 
"Miranda" rights, and then asked him if he had any drug 
paraphernalia. Responding "follow me," defendant led the 
officers outside to a shed and pointed out his scales, which the 
officers seized (R. 306-07, 380). 
Pretrial Motions 
Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss, alleging 
entrapment, had statutory and constitutional bases. He argued 
that Officer Burchett had entrapped him under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-303 (1990) (R. 48). He also argued that Burchett's 
undercover activity violated the due process clauses of the Utah 
and federal constitutions (R. 46). 
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Defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana and scales 
challenged the warrantless seizure of these items. He argued 
that the marijuana had been seized while outside the area within 
his immediate control, such that the "search-incident-to-arrest" 
exception to the warrant requirement did not apply (R. 95-96). 
He also argued that no other "exigent circumstances" allowed 
officers to seize the marijuana without first obtaining a search 
warrant (R. 96-100). 
Defendant further argued that he had not voluntarily 
consented to any search of the premises. The State did not argue 
consent with respect to the marijuana seizure; thus defendant's 
"no consent" argument challenged only the seizure of his scales 
(R. 118). He argued that under the Utah Constitution, warnings 
about the right to refuse consent to search should be required 
(R. 101-06). On appeal, defendant reasserts his entrapment and 
illegal search arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant should not have been allowed to preserve his 
entrapment argument by entering a conditional guilty plea. The 
function of such a plea is limited to preservation of pretrial 
motions to suppress evidence, which are procedural in nature. 
However, entrapment is a substantive defense, and Utah's 
entrapment statute provides that pretrial entrapment arguments, 
if denied, will proceed to trial. Thus a conditional guilty plea 
may not be used to preserve an entrapment argument. Because the 
parties and the trial court failed to recognize this, defendant 
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may be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to 
trial; alternatively, he may opt to dismiss his entrapment 
argument on appeal. 
If defendant's entrapment argument is now entertained, 
his pretrial motion to dismiss was properly denied. There was 
ample evidence upon which a jury could have found that defendant 
had not been entrapped, and therefore found him guilty of the 
charged offense. Accordingly, his motion to dismiss was properly 
rejected under controlling interpretations of Utah's entrapment 
statute. Defendant's constitutional, "due process" entrapment 
argument should not be reached, for he does not challenge the 
validity of the entrapment statute, which already exceeds federal 
due process standards. Utah's strong separation-of-powers 
requirement bars creation of a parallel entrapment definition 
under a constitutional analysis where the legislature has already 
spoken on the subject. Therefore, the statute controls the 
definition of entrapment under due process principles. 
Defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana was 
properly denied. The only question here is whether the marijuana 
was seized from an area within defendant's immediate control when 
he was arrested. The legal definition of "within immediate 
control" is rather flexible, such that the trial court did not 
err in ruling that the marijuana was validly seized incident to 
defendant's arrest. Further, the officers' proper protective 
"sweep" of the premises following the arrest would have recovered 
the marijuana in any event. 
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The seizure of defendant's scales became a moot issue 
when the paraphernalia charge was dropped pursuant to his plea 
bargain. Therefore, in light of the prohibition against 
"advisory opinions," the State does not address the "voluntary 
consent" argument raised in connection with that issue, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT CANNOT PRESERVE HIS ENTRAPMENT 
ARGUMENT UNDER A CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA; HE 
THEREFORE MAY EITHER WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, OR 
DISMISS HIS ENTRAPMENT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL. 
This Court should not now review defendant's argument 
that undercover officer Burchett entrapped him into committing 
the offense of possessing a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute. Defendant should not have been allowed to enter a 
conditional guilty plea upon the denial of his pretrial 
entrapment argument. He should have proceeded to trial. 
A. Statutory Entrapment is a Substantive Defense, 
Ultimately for the Trial Jury to Decide. 
The conditional guilty plea is an approved means of 
obtaining appellate review of pretrial motions to suppress 
evidence based upon constitutional search and seizure rules. 
This practice was endorsed in State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939-40 
(Utah App. 1988), and is commonly used in Utah. However, 
appellate review of a motion to suppress evidence merely 
establishes whether the State should be "barred from being able 
to prove its case because of the illegal seizure of evidence." 
Serv, 758 P.2d at 939. Accord State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119, 
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332 N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (1983) (principal concern of conditional 
plea is review of rulings under the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule). As such, appellate review of suppression issues is a 
procedural question, legitimately undertaken without regard to 
the defendant's guilt. 
In contrast, an entrapment defense is directed to the 
question of guilt or innocence. Utah's entrapment statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1990), provides in pertinent part: 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped 
into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs 
when a law enforcement officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense does 
not constitute entrapment. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the 
court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall 
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the 
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. . . . 
(5) Should the court determine that the 
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case 
with prejudice, but if the court determines the 
defendant was not entrapped, such issue may be 
presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. 
Any order by the court dismissing a case based on 
entrapment shall be appealable by the state. 
The statute establishes an "objective" test of entrapment, as 
contemplated by the Model Penal Code provision from which it was 
derived. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 502 (Utah 1979) 
(comparing statute with section 2.13(1) of the Model Penal Code). 
As such, evidence of the accused's predisposition to commit the 
crime, a feature of the "subjective" entrapment test, is 
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irrelevant. Only police conduct is examined, albeit against the 
likely response of a hypothetical "average person," "not 
otherwise ready to commit" the crime in question, JId. at 503. 
Because Utah's statute focuses upon police conduct, the 
entrapment question masquerades as a purely procedural one, 
seemingly inviting appellate review through a conditional guilty 
plea, as permitted with search and seizure issues under Serv. 
However, alert reading of the statute, and of caselaw 
interpreting it, reveals otherwise. 
Even as a procedural matter, the entrapment statute 
prescribes the steps to appellate review. Under subsection (5), 
a successful pretrial entrapment argument, resulting in a 
dismissal, is appealable by the State. However, if the pretrial 
entrapment argument fails, subsection (5) permits the defendant 
to reassert the argument to the jury. Instructed under the 
statute, State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747 (Utah 1984), the jury then 
returns a verdict.3 It is readily apparent, therefore, that the 
Utah legislature contemplated direct appeal of pretrial 
entrapment questions only for the State. A defendant, to obtain 
such review, must first be found guilty at trial. 
Caselaw also contemplates that pretrial denial of an 
entrapment argument does not constitute a finding that there was 
3Under Utah practice, the jury is instructed that the 
entrapment defense may raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Taylor, 599 P.2d at 504 (Crockett, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting jury instruction); State v. Moore, 782 
P. 2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989). However, Model Penal Code § 2.13(2) 
(1985) places the burden on defendant to establish entrapment by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
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no entrapment. Instead, such denial is but a provisional 
assessment that the question should be resolved at trial. See, 
e.g., State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986) (defendant 
was not entrapped "as a matter of law," and the question "was 
properly left to the jury"); State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 
(Utah 1980) (same). Thus pretrial rejection of an entrapment 
defense is not akin to a final judgment, as is the denial of a 
motion to suppress evidence, that might be appealed through a 
conditional guilty plea. Instead, the issue remains open, as a 
substantive defense to guilt. 
A defendant cannot preserve a substantive defense for 
appellate review by entering a conditional guilty plea. On 
appeal, such a plea amounts to a self-contradictory assertion of 
"guilty but not guilty." This is fundamentally different from a 
plea preserving evidence suppression issues, where the defendant 
asserts "guilty but prosecution is barred." Under Utah's 
entrapment statute, then, only rejection of the entrapment 
defense at trial, leading to a guilty verdict, gives rise to a 
final decision from which the defendant may appeal, consistently 
maintaining an argument that he or she is "not guilty." The 
statute does not permit a guilty plea, effectively conceding the 
absence of entrapment, followed by an appellate opportunity to 
revoke that concession. 
Sound jurisprudence also weighs against permitting 
appellate review of denied, pretrial entrapment arguments through 
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a conditional guilty plea. First, the Utah Constitution contains 
an explicit separation-of-powers provision: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. In Serv, 758 P.2d at 939, this Court 
permitted the use of conditional guilty pleas to preserve 
suppression issues only after noting that the legislature was 
silent on the issue. However, in the entrapment statute, the 
Utah legislature has spoken on how entrapment questions may reach 
appellate courts. An alteration of the legislature's decision by 
this Court, permitting entrapment to be decided through a 
conditional guilty plea, without trial, would violate the Utah 
Constitution. 
Second, " [i]t is not the function of a reviewing court 
to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility of 
witnesses," or otherwise sit as a first-line factfinder. State 
v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). As already 
discussed, the entrapment statute is a tool for deciding guilt or 
innocence. Further, here defendant and Officer Burchett gave 
conflicting testimony on a number of facts relating to 
entrapment. This Court, which will never see nor hear these 
witnesses, cannot decide which one to believe. Cf.. Taylor, 599 
P.2d at 505 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting) ("I have no desire to 
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join in becoming a super-jury to free this defendant"). As set 
forth in Warden, this appellate court cannot sit as a jury to try 
this case. 
Finally, when a defendant proceeds to trial and 
succeeds in an entrapment defense, an acquittal results, and 
potential appellate issues become moot. Here this is true both 
with regard to defendant's statutory entrapment claim, and to his 
"due process"-based entrapment argument. Regarding the latter 
argument, it is a fundamental principle that appellate courts 
should not decide constitutional issues in advance of the 
necessity of doing so. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 
(Utah 1985). Because defendant's statutory entrapment defense 
could conceivably succeed at trial, mooting his constitutional 
argument, it is not necessary to consider that argument now. 
On the other hand, if defendant is found guilty at 
trial, both his statutory and due process entrapment claims can 
be reviewed on appeal, and upon a more complete evidentiary 
record than now exists. As things stand now, defendant is asking 
this Court to prematurely pass judgment on the entrapment 
question. This Court should decline to do so. 
B. Conditional Guilty Pleas Preserving Entrapment 
Arguments Should be Prospectively Prohibited; 
Defendant Should Either Withdraw this Guilty Plea, 
or Dismiss his Appellate Entrapment Argument. 
This Court recently reviewed a pretrial entrapment 
argument, preserved through a conditional guilty plea, in State 
v. Richardson, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. Nov. 25, 1992). 
It further appears that another such case is now pending in this 
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Court, State v. Bryant, No. 920232-CA. As just set forth, the 
State now believes that this is procedurally improper. The 
practice should be prospectively discontinued. 
In fact, in denying a pretrial, entrapment-based motion 
to dismiss, the Richardson trial court did not find that 
defendant had not been entrapped. Instead, it was merely "not 
persuaded" that the defendant had been entrapped. Richardson, 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45 (Bench, P.J., concurring) (quoting trial 
court's ruling). This was entirely consistent with the State's 
analysis here: where entrapment is not so certain as to be "a 
matter of law," it is for the jury to decide. 
In sum, a trial court's pretrial rejection of a 
statutory entrapment argument is merely a "gatekeeping" decision 
that the jury should decide the issue. Because the parties and 
the trial court mistakenly presumed that a conditional guilty 
plea was permissible to allow appellate review of defendant's 
entrapment argument, defendant should be allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea, if he so desires, and proceed to trial. See State 
v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983) (where state 
erroneously agreed to entry of a conditional plea, the defendant 
was permitted to withdraw it). If his entrapment defense fails 
at trial, it can then be reviewed on a subsequent appeal. 
Alternatively, defendant may dismiss his entrapment claim on 
appeal, and proceed solely on his evidentiary suppression issues. 
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POINT TWO 
EVEN IF CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME, DEFENDANT'S 
ENTRAPMENT ARGUMENT WOULD FAIL. 
Perhaps defendant's guilty plea might be treated as a 
guilty verdict, rendered by the bench upon the hearing of his 
entrapment argument. If this is possible, or if this Court 
otherwise deems it proper to now review the pretrial denial of 
defendant's entrapment argument, that argument cannot prevail, on 
statutory or "due process" grounds. 
A. There is Sufficient Evidence to Reject Defendant's 
Statutory Entrapment Defense, and to Support a 
Guilty Verdict. 
However this Court might choose to review defendant's 
entrapment-based motion to dismiss, its standard of review must 
be deferential. As in reviewing a jury verdict, appellate courts 
uphold the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence so long as "some evidence exists from which a reasonable 
jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 
1225 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). The same standard applies to 
a verdict returned against an entrapment defense. State v. 
Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986). 
This standard is amply satisfied here. A jury 
obviously could choose to believe the testimony of Officer 
Burchett over that of defendant. Thus it could find that 
Burchett did no more than behave in a friendly, somewhat 
flirtatious manner toward defendant, and that she inquired, 
without demanding, whether defendant could obtain drugs. A jury 
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could also find that the purchase of the pound of marijuana, 
leading to the charges in question, was initiated by defendant, 
and that defendant even asked to purchase an additional five 
pounds of marijuana from Burchett. 
Under the entrapment standard of section 76-2-303, 
then, a jury could readily find that Burchett's undercover 
actions did not create "a substantial risk that the offense would 
be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it," and could 
find instead that Burchett did no more than afford defendant "an 
opportunity to commit an offense." It could therefore find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was not entrapped, and 
find him guilty of the drug possession charge. 
Such a finding would be upheld on appeal. Under the 
statute, and viewing the evidence in the most favorable light, 
Udell, 728 P.2d at 132, Utah appellate courts consistently refuse 
to overturn guilty verdicts, and find entrapment, in the absence 
of "personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to extreme 
vulnerability" by police agents. State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60, 
62 (Utah 1986). See, e.g., State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 
(Utah 1989) ("no pleas of desperation or appeals based primarily 
on sympathy or close personal friendship"); Udell, 728 P.2d at 
132 (no entrapment where officer shared cocaine with defendant 
once, then made four additional cocaine requests over the next 
five weeks); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah App. 1989) 
(no resort to "pity, sympathy, or money"); State v. Wvnia, 754 
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App.) (no high-pressure tactics, "[a]ll the 
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officers had to do was ask" for drugs), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 
1987) ("no pleas of desperation or appeals to friendship or 
loyalty"). Compare State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 
1987) (agent presented herself as an attractive single mother 
experiencing hard times); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 497-99, 
503-04 (Utah 1979) (agent was the defendant's recent lover, and 
pleaded with him for heroin to alleviate her withdrawal 
sickness). By comparison here, Burchette used no high-pressure, 
extreme tactics that would have created a "substantial risk" that 
an average person would respond as defendant did. 
Given all this, the trial court clearly did not err in 
denying defendant's entrapment-based motion to dismiss. Nor 
would a trial factfinder—jury or judge—have clearly erred in 
finding defendant guilty. 
B. Defendant's Constitution-Based Entrapment Argument 
Fails Because this Case is Controlled by Utah's 
Entrapment Statute. 
1. Federal Analysis. 
Defendant's constitutional, "due process"-based 
entrapment argument, while creative, cannot prevail. He argues 
that Officer Burchett's investigative conduct here was 
"outrageous," "conscience shocking," or "fundamentally repugnant" 
(Br. of Appellant at 16-18), along the lines of conduct 
condemned, and held to violate federal due process principles, in 
United States v. Twiqq, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978). In Twiqq, 
however, government agents, through an informant, assisted the 
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defendant in setting up a drug laboratory—providing chemicals, 
laboratory equipment, and even a house for the laboratory site. 
588 F.2d at 375. Apparently without this extraordinary 
assistance, the defendant would have been unable to even commit 
the charged crime of illegal drug manufacturing. 
More recently, in Jacobson v. United States, U.S. 
, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992), the United States Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction for receiving child pornography through the 
mail.A In Jacobson, a two-and-a-half year campaign by federal 
agents, posing as pornography sellers, and including over two 
dozen mailings, had finally induced the defendant to order the 
prohibited material. 112 S. Ct. at 1538-41. The Jacobson 
campaign also asked the defendant to join in a lobbying effort 
against anti-pornography "censorship." .Id. at 1542. 
Officer Burchett's undercover operations here fall well 
short of the investigative overreaching in Twigg and Jacobson. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, Burchett did not extend him 
excess credit, enabling him to make an otherwise unaffordable 
marijuana purchase. In fact, Burchett refused to deliver the 
marijuana upon his initial proffer of a 300 dollar down payment. 
Instead, she insisted on full payment, and compromised only to 
the extent of the fifty-dollar check toward the full 850 dollar 
price. Nor did Burchett resort to a long-term campaign, along 
AJacobson turned upon the subjective, federal entrapment test, 
and the prosecution's failure to establish the defendant's 
predisposition to commit the charged crime. Nevertheless, the 
government conduct in Jacobson is illustratively useful for its 
contrast with Officer Burchett's conduct here. 
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the lines of Jacobson, to induce defendant's criminal act. 
Instead, her contact with defendant lasted only some eight or 
nine months, and was primarily social in nature. 
2. State Analysis, 
On the state side, defendant takes historical note of 
"popular mistrust and hostility toward government" among the 
drafters of state constitutions. See Flynn, Federalism and 
Viable State Government; the History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 
Utah L. Rev. 311, 314 (quoted in Br. of Appellant at 19). 
However, a fundamental feature of state constitutions is their 
establishment of democracy—that is, government by the people 
themselves. 
Here the people of Utah, through their legislature, 
have defined the parameters of entrapment by statute. Defendant 
has not challenged that statute under due process grounds, and 
indeed, as a product of the democratic process, it carries a 
presumption of constitutional validity. See Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632 (1979). That 
presumption is so strong that the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that a statute will be struck down only if it is shown to be 
unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bell, 785 
P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). 
Further, defendant does not cite, nor has the State 
found, Utah caselaw expressing any doubt about the constitutional 
validity of the entrapment statute. He cannot bypass the 
statute, and argue for a parallel, more defense-favorable 
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entrapment standard under the state constitution. That argument 
invites this Court to perform legislative functions that, as set 
forth earlier, are forbidden to it under the separation-of-powers 
requirement of Utah Constitution. 
Seen in the foregoing light, it is readily apparent 
that defendant's "due process" arguments are subsumed within 
Utah's entrapment statute, as authoritatively construed by Utah 
courts. His complaint that Officer Burchett's undercover 
activity was "outrageous" must be analyzed in light of the 
statute's more sober terminology, and the caselaw that has 
developed under it. As already set forth, Burchett's conduct was 
acceptable under the statute. 
In fact, Utah's entrapment statute already exceeds 
federal due process standards. Federal courts apply a subjective 
test, so that a defendant who raises the entrapment defense 
invites exposure of his or her past conduct and character. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500. Because Utah's statute adopts an 
objective test, focusing only on police conduct, defendants may 
utilize the defense free from risk that as a result, they may be 
unfairly convicted based upon past conduct and character 
evidence. See State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 749-50 & n.3 (it 
was reversible error to give an entrapment instruction that may 
have caused the jury to focus on the defendant's disposition). 
Thus as a matter of fundamental fairness, the due process 
standard contained within Utah's entrapment statute is already 
more defense-favorable than the federal standard. 
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In State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court did consider both statutory and due process-
based entrapment arguments. However, the latter argument was 
reached only after a determination that the statutory entrapment 
defense was unavailable to the defendant, because the charged 
crime contained an element of causing or threatening bodily 
injury. 766 P.2d at 1064-65 (interpreting subsection 76-6-303(2) 
of the entrapment statute). That justification for reaching a 
constitutional entrapment argument is not present here. 
If reached, defendant's due process argument fails. 
The Colonna court criticized an undercover officer who had 
provided and shared drugs and alcohol with defendant. He had 
also provided transportation for a robbery committed by the 
defendant, and participated in the robbery to such a degree that 
the victim was more fearful of the officer than of the defendant. 
766 P.2d at 1065-66 & n.2. Nevertheless, the supreme court 
concluded that the officer's conduct was "not so extreme as to 
constitute a due process violation under either the Utah or the 
United States Constitution." jCd. at 1066 (emphasis added). 
Here Officer Burchett stopped well short of the 
undercover conduct in Colonna. She provided drugs to defendant, 
but only at a price; the drugs she pretended to consume with 
defendant were provided by him, not her. She engaged in some 
flirtatious behavior and some feigned lewdness, but no crime of 
violence was involved. Thus even if this Court might engage in a 
parallel constitutional analysis, separate from the statutory 
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entrapment analysis, Burchett's undercover activity clearly 
passes muster under controlling precedent, 
POINT THREE 
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION ISSUES MAY 
NOT BE PRESENTLY REACHABLE; IF REACHED, THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS HOME. 
Defendant next challenges the denial of his motion to 
suppress the marijuana and the weighing scales seized from his 
home. As a threshold matter, it is questionable whether this 
point on appeal should even be reached at this time. To the 
extent it may be reached, the trial court correctly rejected the 
motion to suppress. 
A. The Unusual Procedural Stance of this Case May 
Preclude Consideration of the Suppression Issue at 
This Time. 
The procedural peculiarity of this case weighs against 
consideration of the search and seizure issue at this time. If 
defendant withdraws his guilty plea, as suggested in Point One of 
this brief, this case returns to pretrial status. In that event, 
his motion to suppress evidence would be open to review only as 
an interlocutory appeal. On the other hand, as set forth in 
Point Two, perhaps defendant's plea-supported conviction might be 
reviewed as a guilty verdict, rejecting defendant's entrapment 
defense, on the drug possession charge. 
Either of the foregoing possibilities, however, raises 
new questions. If the guilty plea is withdrawn, defendant should 
first satisfy this Court that interlocutory review of the 
evidence suppression issues is appropriate under Rule 5, Utah 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure. If his plea is treated as a guilty 
verdict, however, admission of the contraband in question is 
susceptible, in part, to harmless error analysis. It is also, in 
part, a moot issue. 
Regarding unlawful drug possession, the pound of 
marijuana supporting that charge presumably can be traced from 
police hands into defendant's possession. Adding in the money 
defendant paid to Burchett for the marijuana, the portion of the 
marijuana defendant left with Burchett, plus Burchett's testimony 
and the transcripts of the surreptitiously recorded sale, it 
seems that defendant's guilt is a foregone conclusion, with no 
need to admit the marijuana into evidence. Accordingly, 
admission of the marijuana into evidence would be harmless error. 
See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1982 
(1970) (conviction upheld where possibly erroneous admission of 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-79, 106 S. 
Ct. 3101, (1986) (discussing harmless constitutional error). 
A similar harmless error analysis might apply to the 
paraphernalia charge, where defendant's scales are the contraband 
in question. However, mootness disposes of this question. The 
paraphernalia charge was dropped pursuant to defendant's plea 
bargain. "A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." Burkett v. 
Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). A ruling from this 
Court that defendant's scales were not seized pursuant to his 
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voluntary consent, and therefore should have been suppressed, 
cannot affect his drug possession conviction, which is the only 
conviction under review. Thus the seizure of the scales is a 
moot issue that, under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(mootness), is not susceptible to appellate review. 
The evidence suppression issues advanced on appeal thus 
present, at best, harmless error. If those issues are now 
addressed, this Court's resolution of them will amount to an 
advisory opinion, which is generally disfavored. See Meadow 
Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1220-21 & 
n.8 (Utah App. 1991). At the very least, defendant should be 
required to clarify the procedural pathway he wishes to follow, 
before this Court addresses the suppression questions. 
B. To the Extent Reachable on this Appeal, the Trial 
Court's Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence Should be Affirmed. 
As just shown, defendant's challenge to the seizure of 
his scales is moot. Accordingly, the State will not address the 
merits of that issue. Only the seizure of the marijuana, 
supporting the appealed-from conviction, will be addressed. 
1. The Marijuana: Search Incident to Arrest. 
The trial court ruled that the marijuana was properly 
seized from defendant's utility room incident to his lawful 
arrest (R. 148, copied in the addendum to Br. of Appellant). 
Defendant did not challenge the lawfulness of his in-home arrest 
in the trial court, nor does he raise such challenge on appeal. 
Accordingly, that possible issue has been waived. State v. 
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Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984), reversed in part on 
other grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987). Only 
the lack of a search warrant is assailed. 
With the lawfulness of the arrest conceded, the only 
remaining question is whether the marijuana was in an area within 
defendant's "immediate control" when he was arrested. If so, the 
it was validly seized under the "search incident to arrest" 
exception to the search warrant requirement, set forth in Chime1 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-68, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040-43 
(1969). Under governing law, the seizure was valid. 
This Court has noted that the area within an arrestee's 
"immediate control" is defined rather flexibly. See State v. 
Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769, 784-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The fact that the arrestee is physically 
restrained, for example, does not prohibit a warrantless search 
into nearby areas into which, "generally, if not inevitably," he 
or she might reach. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 784-85 n.29 (quoting 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 
(1981)). Therefore in Harrison, a diaper bag was held properly 
searched incident to the defendant's arrest, even though he was 
lying on the ground at the time, under guard, some ten feet away 
from the bag. 805 P.2d at 784-85. So holding, this Court 
followed Utah precedent holding searches to be properly "incident 
to arrests," even though the arrestees had been effectively 
restrained. Id. at 784 (citing, among others, State v. Kent, 665 
P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1983) (search of automobile was proper even 
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though arrestee was handcuffed and lying on ground next to car)). 
Accord State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 856 (Utah 1978) (arrestee 
need not be able to move about in order to justify search 
incident to arrest). 
This case is well in line with Harrison and its 
supporting precedent. Defendant testified that the marijuana was 
seized from his utility room as he lay, just arrested, on his 
kitchen floor (R. 300). By his own measurement, he was then only 
about ten feet away from the adjoining utility room at that time 
(R. 301), the same rough distance between the arrestee and the 
searched item in Harrison. Nor did the fact that defendant was 
restrained remove the utility room from the area within his 
"immediate control," as that term has been construed. Given 
this, it is readily apparent that the marijuana was validly 
sought and seized incident to defendant's arrest. 
It is also significant that, unlike the situation in 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 754, 89 S. Ct. at 2035, the officers here did 
not find and seize the marijuana upon widespread rummaging 
throughout defendant's home. Instead, they limited the immediate 
search to the close-by area where Burchett had seen defendant 
deposit the marijuana. Because the officers thus stayed well 
within the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest, cf. 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762, 89 S. Ct. at 2039-40, and State v. 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986), the search was valid 
under well-established search and seizure principles. Thus the 
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trial court correctly ruled that the marijuana was validly seized 
incident to defendant's arrest. 
2. The Marijuana: Inevitable Discovery. 
The trial court also noted that the arresting officers 
were permitted to make a cursory sweep of defendant's home upon 
his arrest (R. 148). In fact, the officers did make such a 
sweep, confirming Officer Burchett's belief that no other persons 
were hiding in the home (R. 380, 465-66). Under settled law, 
such a protective measure is proper. See State v. Kellyf 718 
P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986), and State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78 
(Utah App. 1990) (both citing authorities); accord Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990). 
Thus even if the officers could not have looked into 
defendant's utility room as an area within his immediate personal 
control, they were permitted to do so as part of their cursory, 
protective sweep. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S. Ct. at 
("the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other 
spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an 
attack could be immediately launched"). There the marijuana, 
recognizable as probable criminal evidence, would have come into 
plain view, and would have been lawfully subject to seizure 
without a warrant. See Kellv, 718 P.2d at 390. 
The marijuana would have thus been seized in the 
foregoing, independently legal fashion, even if it were deemed 
not properly seized under the more traditional "incident to 
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arrest" standard. See id. at 392; accord Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2533-35 (1988) 
(explaining "independent source" and "inevitable discovery" 
rules). The trial court properly assigned this alternative basis 
to deny defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the problems with defendant's conditional guilty 
plea, and questions of prematurely-presented issues, harmless 
error, and mootness, this case presents a procedural conundrum. 
Before this appeal proceeds further, defendant should be required 
to clarify the procedural pathway he wishes to follow. As things 
presently stand, only some of the issues presented on appeal may 
properly be addressed. On the merits of those issues, however, 
defendant's conviction can be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' ' day of January, 1993. 
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APPENDIX I 
Transcript of Marijuana Transaction in Burchett's Home 
V ^ O O C TT 
7/30/91 
Morning/Reverse 
Don Keitz 
Page 1 
Tape begins with static for approximately 17 seconds 
You found it. Laugh 
Inaudible 
Inaudible 
Static for approximately 23 seconds 
It was my fault, I shouldn't have asked (inaudible) pick it up at my house. 
Inaudible 
Huh? 
Inaudible - early for me. 
Oh yeah, I got a lot of shit going on (inaudible) 
Tape cuts in and out for approximately 2 seconds 
Inaudible - people (inaudible) because people schedule me (inaudible) people 
do rrorning, you know, if were gonna do something make sure, a. 
You want seme water, er. 
No, thanks, I'm fine. Yeah (inaudible) I got to put a little ice on this. You don't 
make a habit of this do ya? 
No, not at all. 
Inaudible 
Tape cuts in and out 
Well. 
Inaudible 
Tape cuts in and out 
Inaudible 
Inaudible 
Tape cuts in and out 
Should be good. 
Yeah. 
Morning/Reverse 
Don Keitz 
Page 2 
Inaudible 
Tape cuts in and out 
Inaudible - here. 
That's (inaudible) 
Ok. 
I don't have any (inaudible) 
I got. 
Tape cuts in and out 
Uwui. 
Inaudible - laugh 
Ok 
Tape cuts in and out 
Inaudible - for the deal. 
Tape cuts in and out/static for approximately 6 seconds 
Inaudible - two (inaudible) by 4:00 it should be wrapped up and by 5:00 (inaudible) 
at the very latest I'll just go to the bank (inaudible) you know, if they fuck me up 
but they won't, ok. It's money that is owed me you know, I don't want to make more trips 
and I don't want you guys to either. I'll take this in a heartbeat. Is that cool, 
Annie? We'll see how much is there to. A, ok, I got three (inaudible) more than 
enough for it, more than 850 for it (inaudible) 
He'll get pissed of it's gone. 
Well, (inaudible) 
Inaudible 
Well, Annie, would that be cool? What if I get back by 5:00. I've got one more 
(inaudible). This is nice, I don't want to let it go. Is that cool? 
Tape cuts in and out 
Let's see what we got here, Annie. 
Well, if it's short I don't have any spare. 
1'uo.i.;,-
7/30/91 
Morning/Reverse 
Don Keitz 
Page 3 
Tape cuts in and out 
Bear. 
Approximately 9 seconds of static 
Inaudible 
Inaudible 
Yeah it is. That's why I wanted to take a little bit but I don't want to put you on the 
hot seat either. A, but lets don't (inaudible) you know, we'll get him his money 
(inaudible) trust me little one, trust me dear. 
Inaudible 
Where's your little calculator? You got one? 
Static for approximately 2 seconds 
Oh, Annie (inaudible) 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximatley 1 minute 
And what do you want out of it? 
l/8th 
Inaudible - you mean, an eighth of a pound. Heck, it's worth more than that to me. 
How about an ounce? 
Inaudible 
This is over, Annie. 
It's over? 
Yeah. 
Really? 
A, we don't know with this bag here, between 10 and 13.5 (inaudible) 
Inaudible conversation for approximately 14 seconds 
Inaudible 
Yeah - (inaudible conversation) 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 14 seconds 
Inaudible - that's nice you got (inaudible) ,**.*• 
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Laugh 
There was all kinds of fuckin' whiff up in Salt Lake. 
Was there really? 
Yeah, I don't know, I said, I should have just brought you some. 
I would have traded that. Laugh 
I'll bring you, hey, I'll bring you same you know, the next time I get around it, I just 
don't do it anymore. 
Hi tun. 
Ok, let's see (inaudible) zero everything (inaudible) 
Good. 
Ok (inaudible conversation) So, here we go (inaudible conversation) see all this 
(inaudible) yeah, I'll be right fuckin' back, I promise you, Annie, I won't fuck you 
up with this stuff, ok. You'll meet your deadline, he won't even know. Who is he 
anyhow? Any relation to Ira Schqppmann? (inaudible) 
Who? 
The sheriff. 
Not that I know of. 
Ok (inaudible) a pound is 448 to 458 plus the bag, right (inaudible) ok we're over. 
It's 46 (inaudible) how about I can see why he wants that cash now, I got to get it 
for him. Annie, close that window. 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 5 seconds 
Four. 
Static for approximately 12 seconds 
I say 456 or 476 ok, here we go 476 minue 448 oh (inaudible) 16 there's 28, there's a 
fuckin' pound. 
An ounce, an ounce over? 
Over, for you is that cool? 
That's (inaudible) 
Now, I'm gonna get on my ass and go get this money and get it back to you. (inaudible) 
You sure they aren't going to be waiting for me out there, huh? 
Inaudible 
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Huh, everything cool, Annie? (inaudible) 
Want me to come with ya? 
Yeah. 
But I don't want. 
Inaudible 
I don't want him, I don't want him to oame back and. 
He won't, I'll be here before he gets here. 
Let me go with you. Laugh 
You can do that to if you want but I've got to a, a. 
Cause I don't want to be here and not have the money or the stuff. 
You want to go with me to round it up? 
Ok. 
Or should I oome back? 
It doesn't matter, but I don't, I don't want to be here without the money. 
How about if you a, hmrn, you, you won't even give me 2 hours, huh, to do it? The 
guys, the money from Brian Head will be there between 2:00 to 3:00. And that's 
525 bucks right there that's, (inaudible) see that's (inaudible) right there. 
You have to go up to Brian Head to get it? 
No, there coming to Parowan. There doing work there today and they'll oame by. I 
won't burn you on it, Annie. Let me leave you the 3 and I'll get the rest back by 
3:00 ok, cause I got 2 more places to go to. Is that cool? 
What are you saying? (inaudible) 
Well you can. You can do that to. 
Inaudible 
Ok, so you a, you want me to measure out a, a, ounce? I don't work (inaudible), 
Annie, sure that'll work to, no problem, your the boss. And then you'll, don't let 
anybody else in here, ok? 
Yeah. 
Alright, perfect, perfect, and then I won't have to be eating my words but I want the 
mother fucker, ok? 
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Alright, good girl. There you go (inaudible) 
Tape cuts in and out 
Inaudible - I'd sit on it, there isn't stuff. 
Tape cuts in and out 
Inaudible - that's over 28, ok? 
Let me see, it's oh, ok, this is the (inaudible) 
Inaudible - alright, you dig it? 
Inaudible 
Ok, let's do that. Now you will bring this to me, I'm gonna leave you the 300 hundred 
ok and that'll fill it and I'll get (inaudible) the rest. Right fuckin' now. 
Ok. 
Alright, Annie, good girl, I'm gonna take one of these for a, a joint when I get home 
ok? (inaudible) That makes more sense, Annie, I don't want you (inaudible) 
Ok. 
Inaudible - alright. 
Ok, call me as soon as you get* 
I will, as soon as I get, how long will you be here? 
Oh (inaudible) 
Ok. 
I don't know if my boyfriend will drop by. 
Well, then (inaudible) a, look, Annie, you want a (inaudible) I owe you 550 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 35 seconds 
Most people don't they either love it or they don't like it 
Static approximately 6 seconds 
I'll go get (inaudible) 
Inaudible 
Yeah, I will. 
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How a, you'll bring this to me? 
Inaudible 
To Parowan? 
To Parowan. 
Ok, let me tell ya 
Static for approximately 23 seconds 
What are you doing this evening? 
Going out I hope. Laugh 
Laugh 
Laugh (inaudible) you must be (inaudible) right? 
No, Maureen? Hey, is there any money at home? Where is it? Oh, I'll talk to ya later. 
Fine. Ok. Ok, see ya. Bye (inaudible) 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 7 seconds 
A, new how you gonna bring that over, Annie? 
Static/tape cuts in and out for approximately 15 seconds 
I'm in Parowan. (inaudible) I'm in Parowan. 
Static/tape cuts in and out for approximately 25 seconds 
The address is 389 North 100 (inaudible) 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 12 seconds 
Inaudible - oh 
Inaudible - 400 north, now what this is here this corner, this is called the state 
road (inaudible) 
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 1 minute 
Phone rings 
Ok 
Phone rings 
Static/tape cuts in and out/inaudible conversation for approximately 6^5 minutes 
Tape ends 
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A, its alright, its comin'. What's you up to? 
Inaudible 
Inaudible 
Really. 
Inaudible - a, solor (inaudible). 
It's solor power? 
Well, not power it's just a plastic. But that heats, in the winter. 
Hey, we got one little problem, come on iin, your probably gonna kick 
my ass. But, a, well shit.. 
Inaudible 
Inaudible. Were fifty dollars: short, i!can give you a check, I would 
rather, I would, here's what I would like to do. I would like to give 
you, a check then come down and-buy it firom you tomorrow night. 
Tomorrow night? 
Urn huh. Good girl! Good girl. (inaudible) 
Your fifty dollars short? 
Yeah. 
I have fifty dollars. 
Ok, cover me Annie, cover me, now heres the other thing I want you to 
know, that wasn't exactly an ounce over,1it was eighteen (18) grams over, 
I gave you ten (10) grams, ten grams is $ quarter and almost a half ounce 
is a quarter and a half, you know what I'm sayin1? Ten grams, a, quarter 
of an ounce is seven grams, an ounce is 28. I gave you ten grams of mine, 
see we didn't compensate for the bag. 
Ok. 
That way, we weighed it and then but the other way to, I'll be ten short 
on it because that's what I want you to have. 
Urn k. 
You get it? 
Ok. 
Ok. 
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CI: Alright. 
DK: The ten grams is from me, you don't just get the overload, you got the 
eighteen, we were actually eighteen over and the bag was ten. 
CI: Ok. 
DK: Remember that trip. Ok. 
CI: Alrighty. 
DK: Another ten because that should last somebody like you a long time. 
CI: Oh, yeah. 
DK: Gosh, smoke that and just started going to work now. Well, hey, I like 
so, well, will you do that? Do you want to take a check? 
CI: I'll take a check. 
DK: That'll work. 
CI: Well. 
DK: Will you cash it tomorrow? 
CI: Wait till tomorrow? 
DK: Yeah, see I got, in fact, I'm not gonna even have it in the bank till li) 
five o'clock. Is that gonna fuck you up, Annie? 
CI: What's, what's the first? The first is tomorrow right? 
DK: Yeah, I get paid, no tomorrow is the 31st. I get paid tomorrow. 
CI: Ok, Because yeah, I just want to get my rent, you know, paid, it's got 
right on the first, but I can write a check so that'll hold it over to 
you, you know, so I can wait. 
DK: What if you cash mine like tomorrow at a. 
CI: After three or somethin'? 
DK: I don't know if I'll get it in there by that time. 
CI: I can wait till. 
DK: Can you give me a day? 
CI: Till Thursday. 
DK: Fuck man, yeah, yeah, day after, then I know it's in there, ok? 
V O S C TT ~> ? X V I H 
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Ok. 
Your a good kid. Fifty, one, twenty, forty. 
How much do you think I can get fer like an eighth of mine, (inaudible) 
Eighty, two. 
But I can't (inaudible) 
Wait, twenty, forty, (inaudible) forty, sixty, eighty, four, twenty, 
forty, sixty, eighty, five, were fifty short, you count that now, so 
we know, Annie. 
One. 
Well, that's over. 
Three, four. 
Five. Ok, now listen, I'm gonna write this check, if you'll wait that day 
after, I can probably, I'll probably come .and buy that check back from ya. 
I hate checks. 
Urn k. I'll hold on to it then. Until Friday morning. 
If you don't see me it's to bad, you cash the sucker. 
Urn k. I'11 hold on to. 
Static, inaudible conversation approximately 7 seconds 
A hundred will come as soon as you leave. 
Really? 
Yeah, this is a whole different round up bullshit where I got this. But, 
alright, Annie. 
How much do you think I could sell an eighth? 
How much are you gonna sell is what I want to know. 
I'm just, I just want to keep like an eighth. 
Oh, really? 
Uh huh. 
For you, now this is that full boogey? 
Right. 
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DK: We didn't touch it or nothin'? 
CI: Except for the stuff that, a, you gave me and then that little piece that 
you took. 
DK: Perfect, Annie. 
CI: And that's it. 
DK: Annie, now your cookin'. Ok, a, (inaudible) countin'. 
CI: Shit, I don't have scales. 
DK: All you were gonna sell is an eighth and you just want to keep it 
CI: Yeah, I wanted, I wanted to keep an eighth. 
DK: Eighth for money. Ok, I'll tell you what to do (inaudible) What abou 
the boyfriend? Is he nervious about me? Does he know me er? 
CI: He doesn't smoke pot and he doesn't like me even smokin' it. 
DK: Did he hear my phone call? 
CI: Uh huh (negative) 
DK: Ok. Now (inaudible) here's the check, let me get this to ya first. 
Ok, I'm gonna put that this is for some speakers or somethin'. I hope I 
come around and buy it, where will you be tomorrow night, at, tomorrow 
night about seven? 
CI: I'll probably be in the Playhouse. 
DK: Just call, yeah, yeah. 
DK: I don't want to stir things up with your old man. 
CI: I won't, I don't go there till like at nine. 
DK: People like that drop dimes, now don't take that personal and I hope he 
doesn't but I've seen more jealous boyfriends, you know what I mean? 
CI: Yeah. 
DK: You know exactly what I'm talkin1 to, I'm talkin' to a pro here. 
CI: Laugh 
DK: Ok, fifty. I never write checks, Annie. Let's see, to the order, a, oka 
this is your name here, huh, Annie. Annie what? 
CI: B e c k s t e a d . B e c k s t e a d . 
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What if Friday, your boyfriend saw this check, would he ask you a bunch 
of shit? 
Uh huh (negative) he won't see it. 
Oh Bullshit! 
He won't see it, anyway. Laugh 
Right! (inaudible), Annie. This is a, I'm gonna date this tomorrow, ok? 
Ok. 
Because I went and drew some money out of there. I don't want to put 2 
and 2 and coming up with 5 and shit. Ok, a. 
Inaudible 
Inaudible - ninety one, fifty. 
God, your house is gorgeous. 
Thanks, it's a mess. 
I like the way you can just walk right here on the back porch. 
Yeah, I'll have ta actually get this bullshit out of the way, we'll a, 
I'll take you on a little tour. Ok, can I just tell you a couple things. 
Yeah. 
This area is riddled with fuckin' narcs. There are narcs living in your 
subdivision. 
In mine? 
Yeah, I recognized it as I was comin' home. Down, maybe it's further 
toward Kanarra is there another place like that a little further down? 
No, it's that one. 
It's like a subdivision? 
Yeah. 
All along that road to Kanarraville theres. 
Ok, it's in one of those further towards Kanarra, anyway, I want you to 
get all moved. Don't fuck around with the telephone, Annie. 
Really? 
Like we did today, God, that's so bad. They don't even have to be there 
iust have a rprnrHinn re / «• -a.si-n-% - -
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No, I'm not. You aren't are you? Laugh 
Please don't be. 
Laugh 
I worry more about your boyfriends than I do anything else. 
Oh, right. 
Those speakers. Two speakers. 
Cool. 
And I'd like to buy that back from ya, is that where I'd have to come is 
to the Playhouse to see you?"' 
No, just, I'm usually home about seven, I don't go over there till about 
nine. 
Oh, ok, between seven and nine you might be home. 
Yeah. 
If you were I'd run it down in another clar. The old lady's (inaudible) 
give you the money and take this back. 
Urn k. 
These things right here, the telephone will put you in jail. These are 
the two biggest fuckin' ways there is, I.'m serious. It's easy for em. 0 
now, here we go. You got, you got one ounce, you got 28 grams, you want 
a, I'd keep a quarter, sell three quarters and keep a quarter, cause ther 
ain't any weed, Annie. This is like something that has fallen out of the 
sky. 
Urn k. 
Did he say anything that he can get more than this? 
He was talkin', you know, I asked him and he is such a grump sometimes, 
though. 
Uh huh (inaudible) 
Inaudible 
Will you give him all of his money, please. 
Yes. 
Case #5910u874 
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Yeah, 
Alright, I'll get back to ya in other ways. Also, look at these squash 
man, I want to take some of these, we've saved a lot of marriages in the 
past with these. 
Laugh 
You go through there and get what you need little one. 
You have a garden, huh? 
Here's what I'll do, Annie. Is the way things are right now, sell three 
quarters at $60 a piece. Don't sell them at $50. 
Don't sell them at 50? 
No madam, and after the deer hunt, the crops come back in, then it's all 
over. Right now get 60 or don't do it. That'll give you 180 and that'll 
leave you with a whole quarter for yourself. 
Ok. 
See, if you can make a quarter last, if you go to an eighth, your gonna 
smoke up with friends, these friends are selfish, soon as they run out 
there gonna come and smoke that. 
Inaudible 
I know how this works, Annie. Laugh 
Ok. 
This is funny were doing this. 
Laugh 
It's wonderful. 
Oh, wouldn't Corky die? 
Well good, (inaudible) 
Yeah. 
Good for you. 
Yeah, if I can pull it off. 
If what? 
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Put it into force. 
Now listen, the way that is, you can probably just eye that quarter. 
You think so? 
Absolutely. Don't even mess, don't even (inaudible) you can just 
(inaudible) you think this is, thats why you never see me at the 
Playhouse. Lynn Davis and all those guys are hooked into that place. 
Yeah, I've heard. 
Thats his, you know, and he loves to drink and shit, but he don't like 
us stoners, Annie. He doesn't. Even if he's done it, that's his, what 
makes, that's what puts his bread and butter on the table. God, you 
look good in your shorts, come on out here and let me get you on the 
video. 
No! 
Oh, come on please, can't I. 
Inaudible No! 
Why? 
No! Laugh 
Inaudible just do drugs? Ok, (inaudible) in there (inaudible) 
What? 
If I get to your place before eight it should be between 7 and 8. 
Ok, you have my number so you can call right? 
Yeah, because I'd like to come down and buy that back but if not then yoi 
cool. Thanks dear. 
Your welcome. 
Come on out here and look around. 
Inaudible 
Background noise (lawn mower) for approximately 44 seconds 
Let me show you this garden I got goin' (inaudible) I got to get up 
early, Annie, I'm not (inaudible) but I used (inaudible) 
Inaudible 
'• i » f i 'i •' i 
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Inaudible my stuff out. Peas, Potatoes, look at those 
tomatoes, Annie. 
Those are nice. 
You got to take some of the squash with ya. 
Oh yeah (inaudible) 
There really good. 
I love squash. 
And they just go to waste if you don't give them away. Yeah, I got about 
thirty fruit trees back here. 
Yeah, eye that. 
Eye that (inaudible) 
Ok. 
You know what I'm sayin'? Don't let anybody push you on, I'm (inaudible) 
your boyfriend, (inaudible) 
No, he doesn't like it. Doesn't do pot at all, he doesn't like pot, 
but cokes ok but not pot. 
Inaudible - want that recording. 
The what? 
Remember when I called and left a message on your recorder? 
Oh yeah. 
Get that off there for me would ya? 
Ok. 
Good girl, Annie. 
I'll take this one. 
Take a bunch of those. 
Inaudible 
Yeah, (inaudible) maybe (inaudible) do some good. (inaudible) 
put a bunch in there, Annie. We got more coming tonight. 
Inaudible 
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KO: Police, on the floor, on the floor, on the floor. Let me see your hands< 
palms up, palms up. 
Background noise for approximately 11 seconds 
KO: Get back (inaudible) up. 
Background noise/inaudible conversation for approximately 38 seconds 
Tape ends 
DK: Donald Keitz 
CI: Confidential Informant 
KO: Kelvin Orton 
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